终极控制人特征和创业导向关系的实证研究——市场化进程的调节作用

以中国创业板上市公司为样本,探讨了市场化进程对终极控制人特征与企业创业导向间关系的调节作用。层次回归分析结果发现:整体强度方面,非国有企业比国有企业具有更强的创业导向,终极控制人存在两权分离的企业的创业导向比不存在两权分离的企业更强;选择倾向方面,国有企业和存在终极控制人两权分离的企业更倾向于选择资产增值型创业导向;市场化进程负向调节终极控制人特征与创业导向选择倾向的关系,这说明市场化进程的提高可在一定程度上缓解终极控制人创业导向选择中的代理问题。     

An Examination of the Structure of Executive Compensation and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canadian Investigation

We explore the extent to which Boards use executive compensation to incite firms to act in accordance with social and environmental objectives (e.g., Johnson, R. and D. Greening: 1999, Academy of Management Journal 42(5), 564–578 ; Kane, E. J.: 2002, Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 1919–1933.). We examine the association between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility (CSR) for 77 Canadian firms using three key components of executives’ compensation structure: salary, bonus, and stock options. Similar to prior research (McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd: 2003, Journal of Business Ethics 45(4), 341–359), we measure three different aspects of CSR, which include Total CSR as well as CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses. CSR Strengths and CSR Weaknesses capture the positive and negative aspects of CSR, respectively. We find significant positive relationships between: (1) Salary and CSR Weaknesses, (2) Bonus and CSR Strengths, (3) Stock Options and Total CSR; and (4) Stock Options and CSR Strengths. Our findings suggest the importance of the structure of executive compensation in encouraging socially responsible actions, particularly for larger Canadian firms. This in turn suggests that executive compensation can be an effective tool in aligning executives’ welfare with that of the “common good”, which results in more socially responsible firms (Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker: 2002, The University of Chicago Law Review 69, 751–846; Zalewski, D.: 2003, Journal of Economic Issues 37(2), 503–509). In addition, our findings suggest the importance of institutional context in influencing the association between executive compensation and CSR. Further implications for practice and research are discussed.Lois. Mahoney is an Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan University. Her research is focused in the areas of ethics and accounting information systems. She has published in ethics and accounting journals including Journal of Business Ethics, Business Ethics Quarterly, Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting, Information and Organization. Dr. Mahoney has received several research awards, including Best Paper award at the Seventh Symposium on Ethics Research in Accounting. Dr. Mahoney is also actively involved in the American Accounting Association.Linda Thorn is an Associate Professor at York University in Toronto Ontario. Her research focuses on ethical decision making, the ethics of accountants and accounting students and ethical aspects of accounting information. She has published in ethics and accounting journal including among others, Business Ethics Quarterly, Journal of Business Ethics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Behavioral Research in Accounting and Audit: A Journal of Practice in Theory.     

侵权行为的经济分析

经济分析法学是西方法学界和经济学界发展最快的领域之一,运用经济学的方法对法律问题加以阐释,效率与均衡被认定为法律制度的核心理念。特别是在侵权领域引入经济学理论,对侵权行为的责任承担、损害赔偿的事后研究转向了事先分析。因此,从预防成本与预防收益之间的关系对侵权行为的归责原则进行效率分析,并借助“亨德公式”对两种不同的损害赔偿进行经济界定,权衡由侵权行为引起的社会成本差异,当预防的成本小于预防的预期收益,侵权人的预防是必要的、有效率的。如未采取有效的预防措施,侵权人的行为就是无效的,就要受到法律的惩罚。     

城市轨道交通主变电所无功补偿方案研究

分析了城市轨道交通用电负荷的特点及主变电所无功补偿的意义,在现有三种无功补偿方案(电抗器固定补偿、SVC及SVG动态补偿)的基础上,结合轨道交通用电负荷的特点及目前低压配电系统、直流牵引系统新设备的采用,提出了两种新的无功补偿方案。     

行业属性、拉克尔法则与员工薪酬适度性研究--来自2008-2012年中国资本市场的经验证据

员工薪酬适度性是收入分配制度改革的关键。文章借鉴“拉克尔法则”，以行业属性为视角，选取沪深A股同类行业属性上市公司2008-2012年度财务报告数据，计算“拉克尔阀值”，判别员工薪酬适度性。研究发现，针对销售收入异常波动与垄断性的上市公司，“拉克尔法则”无法判别员工薪酬适度性，但竞争性行业上市公司则能判别员工薪酬适度性；同时，“拉克尔法则”能解释行业属性相同而地域不同的上市公司员工薪酬差异。     

环境税的生态补偿效应分析

环境税作为解决负外部性的一个重要手段,在生态补偿过程中发挥着重要作用。本文从经济效率、收入分配、就业、社会福利等几个方面分析了环境税的生态补偿效应,从而为我国生态环境税制的建立健全提供一定的理论依据。     

论我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制的完善

大气污染生态补偿法律机制对于促进区域大气污染联合治理、实现大气污染治理法律正义、创新与完善生态补偿法律机制等具有重要意义。我国现有法律法规就大气污染生态补偿进行了原则性规定,特别是山东、陕西、湖北等地方性法规更是对大气污染生态补偿进行了探索性规范,为大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善提供了有益经验。但从总体来看,我国大气污染生态补偿法律机制尚存在缺乏专门法律支撑、生态补偿主体过窄、补偿方式单一、补偿标准不合理、法律责任不完善等问题。为促进生态文明战略与强化大气污染生态补偿的法律保障,我国应以科学理念为指导,采取有效措施推进大气污染生态补偿法律机制完善。     

国有企业高管薪酬管制与委托代理问题

由于国企高管的经营业绩难以被准确度量，加上监督约束机制不健全，高管的超额薪酬成为国企代理问题的一种典型表现，于是政府将高管薪酬管制作为应急措施来降低代理成本，缓解国企代理问题。采用双重差分法对2011—2018年A股上市公司的分析表明：第二次限薪令在有效限制国企高管薪酬水平的同时，没有对高管在职消费产生显著影响，有效降低了国企代理成本；但第二次限薪令也降低了薪酬激励效应，导致国企高管努力程度降低，由此造成的利益损失又成为新的代理成本。国企薪酬制度改革面临激励与管制的两难选择，应在国企分类改革的基础上对不同类型国企的高管采取不同的激励机制：对公益类及特殊行业的国企增强高管政治晋升激励，对竞争行业（营利性）国企则应在推向市场的同时放松薪酬管制，从而有效降低代理成本，解决国企代理问题。     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams

Research summary : We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT ) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEO s tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization . Managerial summary : Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.